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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff Appellant 
v. 
DUANE POTTS, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20030702-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
RESPONSE TO POINT 1(A) OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: THE 
DISTRICT COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN QUASHING THE 
BINDOVER WITHOUT REVIEWING THE USSS REPORT 
CONSIDERED BY THE MAGISTRATE 
In Point 1(A) of his brief, defendant admits that Judge Frederick granted the 
motion to quash the bindover order without the benefit of reviewing the United States 
Secret Service (USSS) report that was before the magistrate. See Aple. Br. at 12-15. 
Defendant claims that Judge Frederick did not plainly err in doing so because "[he] had 
recorded testimony regarding the contents of the report and summaries by both the State 
and [defendant]." Id. at 13. 
As defendant argues, to establish that Judge Frederick plainly erred the State must 
show that '"(1) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (iii) the error is harmful."' State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998) (quoting 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). Here, the error in quashing the 
magistrate's bindover order on an incomplete record should have been obvious to Judge 
Frederick. See State v. Wodskow, 896 P.2d 29, 32 (Utah App.), cert denied, 910 P.2d 
425 (Utah 1995). Wodskow expressly holds that it is the "defendant's responsibility to 
provide the complete record to the district court" in support of a motion to quash. Id. at 
n.3 (emphasis added). If, as defendant claims, Judge Frederick necessarily reviewed the 
preliminary hearing transcript before quashing the bindover, see Aple. Br. at 11, the judge 
was well aware that the magistrate not only admitted the USSS report, see Rl 52:31-32, 
see Add. A (Aplt. Br.), but also accepted the State's arguments that the three-part exhibit 
supported bindover:1 
I have carefully listened to the testimony that has been presented by 
the captain in this matter, as well as reviewed the audio 
authen-authenti-authentication examination report that has been admitted 
as we \e discussed earlier already. 
I do find that while [defense counsel's] arguments and question raise 
very legitimate issues, that they go to the weight, such as the weight to be 
given the witness' recollections, whether or not the differences are in fact 
alterations or whether they are the result of mistakes, are issues that are for 
the trier of fact. 
The-the State's evidence clearly shows probable cause that there 
was a—that there were differences from the recollections of the original 
interview that. . . [Lt. Sparks] had with the defendant, that clearly showed 
not only answers differences [sic] but portions missing and the report 
shows that there are indications of alterations of the tape and that certainly 
defendant has attached one of the three reports included in Exh. # 1 as an 
addendum to his brief. See Aple. Br. at 12, n.l, and Addendum I. As explained by the 
prosecutor when she submitted the exhibit to the magistrate, the entire exhibit consisted 
of "the amended report, the original report, as well as a third report." Rl 52:31. The 
impropriety of defendant's attaching one part of this extra-record exhibit to his brief is 
discussed, infra, at pp. 5-7, in conjunction with the State's motion to strike the extra-
record material. 
2 
shows, sufficient for a preliminary hearing, probable cause that there was a 
scheme or conduct or an artifice in order to make those 
admissions-omissions or make those changes for the purposes of 
defrauding or misrepresenting facts to the hearing board in order to 
determine whether or not [defendant] ought to be reinstated. 
R152:56-57, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.) (emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the magistrate's reliance on the USSS report, defendant claims 
that any error in quashing the bindover order without reviewing the report would not have 
been obvious to Judge Frederick because he "had the recorded testimony regarding the 
contents of the report and summaries by both the State and [defendant]." Aple. Br. at 13. 
Precisely because the parties argued the report's findings to their own advantage, 
however, it was necessary for Judge Frederick to review the USSS report and determine if 
the magistrate properly accepted the State's arguments regarding its content, 
conclusiveness and significance. 
Specifically, the State argued the report noted five or six alterations in the tape and 
emphasized an edit occurring at 1307 
between the word cpalm' and T in the sentence. If it was one down on the 
(inaudible) he says [C]I got this palm,['] edit, [C]I says I don't need a palm 
pilot, I don't know what it is.['] The very beginning of what is possibly the 
word 'pilot' can be heard just before the edit point. 
Rl52:49-50, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.). The prosecutor additionally emphasized the report's 
finding that there was a suspicious 130 seconds of blank recording on the tape. Id. at 50. 
Defense counsel, on the other hand, argued that the USSS report was not 
conclusive proof that the tape was altered, but merely suggested that "probability." 
R152:52, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.). To the extent the USSS report was proof that the tape 
3 
had been altered, defense counsel argued that it demonstrated "only three 'probable 
alterations' where the word 'no5 may have been artificially inserted." R80. 
Given the parties5 differing views regarding the report's content, conclusiveness 
and significance, it should have been obvious to Judge Frederick that he needed to 
examine the report itself to determine if the magistrate properly ruled that it supported the 
bindover order. Just as the district court in Wodskow "could not properly review and 
subsequently reverse the decision of the magistrate because the complete record was not 
before the court,55 896 P.2d at 32, Judge Frederick could not properly review the 
magistrate's ruling here because he did not have the benefit of the USSS report the 
magistrate relied on. Rl52:56-57, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.). Judge Frederick's error in 
quashing the bindover order on an incomplete record was both obvious and prejudicial 
under Wodskow and should be reversed on that ground. 
* * * 
Motion to Strike Extra-Record Exhibit. In support of his argument that no plain 
error occurred here, defendant has attached one part of the three-part USSS report to his 
brief. See Aple. Br. at 12, n.l, and Addendum I. While the magistrate admitted the 
exhibit which included an "amended report, the original report, as well as a third report,55 
the entire exhibit was returned to the prosecutor at the conclusion of the preliminary 
hearing. See Rl 52:31-32, 59, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.). As set out in the State's opening 
brief, and above, the USSS report reviewed by the magistrate in binding defendant over 
4 
was not provided to Judge Frederick when defendant moved to quash the bindover; 
therefore, the exhibit is not part of the record on appeal. 
"An appellate court's 'review is . . . [of course] limited to the evidence contained 
in the record on appeal.'" State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, % 6, 974 P.2d 279 (quoting 
Wilderness Building Systems v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1985)). "[A]ppellate 
courts of this state do not consider new evidence on appeal." Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 
P.2d 843, 847 (Utah App. 1994) (declining to take judicial notice of date that postal zip 
codes were introduced to the public) (citing Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 
1990)). Accordingly, "[this Court] will not consider evidence which is not part of the 
record." Pliego, 1999 UT 8, \ 7. 
"[Although the record may be supplemented if anything material is omitted, it 
may not be done," as here, "by simply including the [alleged] omitted material in the 
party's addendum." Id. (citing Utah R. App. P. 11(h) ("If any difference arises as to 
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be 
submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth")). 
Defendant's attempt to supplement the record by merely including one part of a three-part 
exhibit in the addenda to his brief is therefore improper. Id. The addendum to a parties' 
brief "may not consist of evidence that is outside the record on appeal." Id. See also State 
v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, f 2, 75 P.3d 923 (holding that because the record contained 
nothing regarding the judge's drug use when it imposed sentence, "defendant's attempt to 
5 
supplement the record by including newspaper articles regarding [the judge's] drug use in 
his briefs addenda [was] improper"). 
More importantly, defendant could not have supplemented the record with the 
"amended report" attached to his brief, even if he had so moved under rule 11(h). 
"Motions under rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure are 'appropriate only 
when the record must be augmented because of an omission or exclusion, or a dispute as 
to the accuracy of reporting, and not to introduce new material into the record.'" Law, 
2003 UT App 228, f 2 (emphasis in original) (quoting Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 
815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah App. 1991)). As noted previously, the record contains no 
indication that Judge Frederick ever received or reviewed any portion of the USSS report 
relied upon by the magistrate. "Because [defendant] attempts to introduce evidence on 
appeal not contained in the record, [this court] cannot consider [it] on appeal." Id. Thus, 
the extra-record amended report attached to defendant's brief must be stricken. 
RESPONSE TO POINT I(B)-(C) OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: JUDGE 
FREDERICK FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY THE BINDOVER 
STANDARD 
Defendant acknowledges that "two pieces of evidence" "support" the 
communications fraud charge upon which he was bound over for trial: "Mr. Sparks' 
memory, and a report by the Secret Service." Aple. Br. at 16 (citing R152:26-27, 30-31). 
In Point 1(B) of his brief, defendant asserts, however, that "neither piece of evidence 
indicates that the alleged alteration was made." Id. First, defendant speculates that 
because "only two minutes" of his recording of the internal affairs interview was played 
6 
at the CSC review hearing, his full "response" to Lt. Sparks questioning "is likely 
elsewhere on that tape." Id. Second, defendant asserts that the alterations found by the 
USSS are immaterial because, "[tjhere is absolutely no indication that the word 'no' was 
inserted after the question[,] '[D]id you accept the palm pilot?5" Aple. Br. at 17. Finally, 
in Point 1(C) of his brief, defendant asserts that, assuming his recording of the internal 
affairs interview was edited, his former defense counsel did it. Aple. Br. at 17-18. At this 
preliminary stage, defendant's theories are irrelevant. The only question is whether the 
State's theory, that defendant committed a communications fraud, is reasonable. See 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 20, 20 P.3d 300. 
Preliminary Hearings and the Probable Cause Standard 
As explained in the State's opening brief, the principle purpose of a preliminary 
hearing is to screen or "'ferret out . . . groundless and improvident prosecutions.'" State v. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 
(Utah 1980) (ellipsis in original)). To that end, Utah courts employ the probable cause 
standard. Clark, 2001 UT 9, j^ 10 ("To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must 
show 'probable cause' at a preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to 
establish that 'the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it'") (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)) (changes in 
original). Because the quantum of evidence (probable cause) required for a bindover is 
the same as that required for an arrest, which is the same as that required for a search, see 
State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah App. 1995), decisions addressing the 
7 
necessary showing for an arrest or search are instructive in this preliminary hearing 
context. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16 ("[W]e see no principled basis for attempting to 
maintain a distinction between the arrest warrant probable cause standard and the 
preliminary hearing probable cause standard"). 
In the Fourth Amendment context, as here, probable cause is "more than bare 
suspicion." United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). On the other hand, the 
evidence to establish probable cause "need not be capable of supporting a finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 15. Indeed, the evidentiary burden for 
probable cause "is significantly less than that needed to prove guilt." State v. Bartley, 784 
P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis added). The facts presented at a 
preliminary hearing do not even have to establish a prima face case of guilt, as in the case 
of a directed verdict motion. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ffif 11, 16. Moreover, "the evidence 
required [to show probable cause at this stage of the proceeding] . . . is relatively low 
because the assumption is that the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the 
investigation continues." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998); accord Clark, 
2001 UT 9, f 10. 
"In establishing probable cause, as the term suggests, we deal not in certainties, but 
in 'probabilities.'" Bartley, 784 P.2d at 1235 (citing Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175). 
Ultimately, "probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt." Brinegar, 338 
U.S. at 1310 (emphasis added) (internal quotes and citations omitted). The Supreme 
Court in Brinegar explained that "[t]hese are not technical; they are the factual and 
8 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [people], not 
legal technicians act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be 
proved." 338 U.S. at 1310; State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah App. 1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that probable cause exists where the 
"'facts and circumstances . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of 
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has 
committed . . . an offense."5 State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, \ 27, 57 P.3d 1052 (arrest case) 
(quotations and citations omitted). In other words, probable cause requires no more than 
a "rationally based conclusion of probability." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 
(Utah 1986); accord State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1994). 
As observed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, "probable cause at a preliminary 
hearing is satisfied when there exists a believable or plausible account of the defendant's 
commission of a felony." State v. Dunn, 359 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Wis. 1984). Therefore, 
even if an innocent explanation for the defendant's conduct might exist, "the law does not 
require that 'all innocent explanations for a person's actions be absent before those 
actions can provide probable cause5" for bindover. See State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d 506, 
509 (Utah App. 1989) (arrest case) (quoting Wood v. United States, 498 A.2d 1140, 1144 
(D.C. 1985)); accord Poole, 871 P.2d at 535 (search case). The probable cause 
requirement is satisfied as long there exists a reasonable inference that supports a 
conclusion that the defendant probably committed the crime, even if there are equally 
strong inferences to the contrary. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 20 (holding that an inference 
9 
of legitimate behavior "does not negate the reasonable inference" of criminal conduct); 
see also Dunn, 359 N.W.2d at 154-156. In short, "'[ujnless the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of a reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim/ the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial." Pledger, 
896 P.2d at 1229 (quoting Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)) (brackets in 
original); accord State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26,110, 44 P.3d 730. 
Role of the Magistrate 
As recognized by the magistrate in this case, its role is a limited one, see Rl52:57, 
see Add. A (Aplt. Br.), because the preliminary hearing "is not a trial on the merits, [but] 
a gateway to the finder of fact." State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998). 
Although the magistrate should not countenance "facially incredible evidence," id., he or 
she may not otherwise "sift or weigh the evidence." State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, \ 
7, 3 P.3d 725, cert denied, 9 P.2d 170 (Utah 2000) (citation omitted); accord Clark, 2001 
UT 9, f 10. "Instead, the magistrate must view all the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10 (inserts and quotations omitted). "It is not for the 
[magistrate] at a preliminary hearing to accept the defendant's version of the facts over 
the legitimate inferences which can be drawn from the [State's] evidence." See People v. 
District Court of Colorado's Seventeenth Judicial District, 803 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 
1990) (en banc) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Deciding between inferences and 
conflicting evidence is left for the jury. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10. Accordingly, "[a] 
10 
magistrate errs when he or she chooses an inference resulting in release of a defendant 
when a reasonable alternative inference" supports the State's case. See State v. Dunn, 
345 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Wis. App.), affd, 359 N.W.2d 151 (Wis. 1984). 
Here, as set out in the State's opening brief, see Aplt. Br. at 3-7, the preliminary 
evidence established that Lt. Sparks' recall of his interview with defendant differed 
dramatically from the recording defendant submitted to the CSC. Lt. Sparks specifically 
remembered defendant admitting that he had accepted a palm pilot from a new employee 
"in exchange for getting [the employee] assigned to his crew." Rl 52:26, see Add. A 
(Aplt. Br.). When defendant claimed that he no longer knew where the Palm Pilot was, 
Lt. Sparks asked if it was "lost in his house?" Rl 52:25-26, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.). 
According to Lt. Sparks, defendant guaranteed him that the Palm Pilot was not in his 
house. Id. 
Lt. Sparks listened for this "fairly lengthy" conversation when defendant played 
his recording of the internal affairs interview at the CSC hearing, but never heard it. 
R152:13, 26-27, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.). Instead, the recording defendant played 
indicated that Lt. Sparks asked only : "Did you accept the Palm Pilot?" and "on the tape 
the answer is 'No.'" R152:14, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.). 
Applying the legal standards appropriate to preliminary hearing, Judge Frederick 
should have denied the motion to quash. To meet the bindover requirement, the State was 
required to present evidence sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that defendant 
"intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth," committed 
11 
communications fraud. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(7) (2003); see Clark, 2001 UT 9, 
\ 16. Lt. Sparks' preliminary hearing testimony that defendant admitted accepting a Palm 
Pilot in exchange for putting a new employee on his crew, is sufficient to establish that 
defendant communicated fraudulently to the CSC when he played his recording of the 
interview that did not include his admission to Lt. Sparks. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, ffi[ 10, 
20; Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38 (directing magistrates to view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution). Given 
defendant's obvious interest in being reinstated to the Davis County Sheriffs Office, the 
more reasonable inference is that defendant, and not his then counsel, altered the tape. 
Moreover, as found by the magistrate, "the statements were made by [defendant's] 
attorney as his representative in a hearing in which [the attorney] was specifically there to 
represent [defendant's] interest. . . And there is—the tape certainly reflected 
[defendant's] language and . . . —voice, and the tape had been obtained from 
[defendant]." Rl52:58, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.). 
Defendant speculates that the "fairly lengthy" conversation Lt. Sparks recalled 
having with defendant was not edited out of defendant's recording, but is still located on 
the unplayed portion of the internal affairs interview. See Aple. Br. at 16. Defendant, 
however, wholly fails to explain how his failure to play inculpatory portions of the 
recording for the CSC was any less of a fraudulent communication. See Section 76-10-
1801. Indeed, by selectively playing only that portion of the tape, edited or not, where he 
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allegedly denied accepting the Palm Pilot, defendant effectively falsely communicated to 
the CSC that he made no admissions during the internal affairs interview with Lt. Sparks. 
In any event, either Lt. Sparks correctly remembered defendant's admission or he 
did not. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-
438, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the prosecution's favor, Clark, 2001 UT 9, 
Tfl[ 10-11, the preliminary evidence more reasonably suggests that Lt. Sparks—who had 
no motive to fabricate—accurately recalled the internal affairs interview and defendant's 
admission that he accepted the Palm Pilot from a subordinate. Judge Frederick should 
have denied the motion to quash on this ground alone. Id. 
The State, however, presented additional evidence supporting the bindover. The 
three-part USSS report concluded that the defendant's recording of the internal affairs 
interview was altered and contained a suspicious 130 seconds of blank recording. See 
Rl 52:31-32, 49-50, see Add. A (Aplt. Br.). Even though Judge Frederick was not given a 
copy of the USSS report here, he knew that the magistrate had accepted the State's 
arguments regarding the significance of the report's findings. See Rl 52:49-50, 55-58, see 
Add. A (Aplt. Br.). Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the 
instant evidence compelled Judge Frederick to deny the motion to quash. The undisputed 
finding that defendant's recording of the internal affairs interview was altered, together 
with Lt. Sparks' recall of the interview, constituted at least "plausible" evidence of 
defendant's guilt, Dunn, 359 N.W.2d at 155, and was thus '"sufficient to warrant a 
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing . . . that the [defendant] ha[d] 
13 
committed" a communications fraud upon the CSC, Tram, 2002 UT 97, \ 27 (quoting 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). By countenancing the possibility of a 
different result, Judge Frederick erroneously chose "an inference resulting in release of [] 
defendant when a reasonable alternative inference" supported the prosecution. Dunn, 345 
N.W.2d at 71. This was error. See Clark, 2001 UT 9,^ 10. 
RESPONSE TO POINT II OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: DISMISSAL 
OF THE FELONY INFORMATION IS A DISPROPORTIONATE 
SANCTION FOR A PROSECUTOR'S TARDINESS 
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that Judge Frederick's dismissal of the 
second degree felony charge was "not a sanction for (the prosecutor's) tardiness[,] but 
merely the proper application of the adversarial process where the judge's role is not to 
make arguments but to evaluate them." Aple. Br. at 19. In support, defendant analogizes 
to State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 364 (Utah 1994) (opinion of Stewart, J., with one 
justice concurring). Id. While Justice Stewart authored the lead opinion in Holland, only 
one other justice concurred in part III upon which defendant relies. Id. at 361. Thus, part 
III "does not represent the views of a majority of the Court," but is rather, in effect a 
dissent. Id. The effective dissent in Holland does not support defendant's claim that the 
instant dismissal was proper. 
According to the Holland dissent, at the sentencing hearing following Holland's 
murder conviction, defense counsel failed to rebut the prosecutor's characterization of the 
murder as intentional. Id. at 363. That "failure to respond allowed the trial court to 
assume that the prosecutor's characterization of the facts was a true and complete version 
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of those facts, even though all the facts that had been developed" suggested the murder 
was unintentional. Id. at 364. 
Defendant broadly assumes that the trial court's "assumption" in Holland "was 
not a sanction on defense counsel for failing to respond[,] but was merely a reaction to the 
breakdown of the adversarial system of criminal justice." Aple. Br. at 20. From this 
unsupported and self-serving assumption defendant apparently reasons that the trial 
court's dismissal here was also not a sanction on the prosecutor for her tardiness, "but 
merely a reaction to the breakdown of the adversarial system of criminal justice." Id. 
What defendant fails to point out, however, is that the Holland dissenters would have 
remanded for a new penalty hearing, given that the penalty hearing held was "adversarial 
in form only." Holland, 876 P.2d at 364 (opinion of Stewart, J., one justice concurring). 
According to the Holland dissenters, when the lower court's assumptions turn out to be 
inconsistent with the record evidence, remand for a rehearing is the appropriate remedy. 
Id. Thus, the effective dissent in Holland does not support defendant's claim that the 
instant dismissal was proper. 
Alternatively, defendant asserts that even if Judge Frederick's dismissal of the 
second degree felony information was meant as a sanction for the prosecutor's tardiness, 
the judge acted within his discretion. Aple. Br. at 20. Defendant cites Rohan v. Bozeman, 
2002 UT App 109, 46 P.3d 753 (Utah App.), cert denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002), in 
support of his claim. Defendant's reliance on Rohan, a civil case, is unavailing in this 
criminal context. 
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In Rohan, this Court upheld the trial court's dismissal with prejudice, even though 
the dismissal deprived "Rohan of the opportunity to litigate the merits of his negligence 
action/' on the ground that "Rohan 'had ample opportunity to litigate [his] case . . . but 
abused such opportunity[.]'" Id. at f 32 (elipses in original). "Rohan waited until 
eighteen days before trial, over two years after he filed his complaint to request a 
continuance and to formally substitute counsel," with no "reasonable explanation for his 
dilatory conduct." Id. at f 19. Even assuming the prosecutor's tardiness to a single 
hearing is comparable to appellant Rohan's failure to litigate his negligence action, 
dismissal of the felony information was inappropriate. 
In citing Rohan, and other civil cases dealing with attorney's fees, see Stewart v. 
Utah Public Service Comm., 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994); Jensen v. Bowman, 892 P.2d 
1053, 1058 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995), defendant wholly 
ignores the distinction between civil and criminal cases set out in the State's opening 
brief, see Aplt. Br. at 12. Dismissal of a civil action may well be an appropriate remedy 
when a party fails to observe the orders of a court "because there the loss falls upon 
private interests and those who invoke the power of a court must be obedient to its orders 
or lose its powers to serve their purposes." See Commonwealth v. Carson, 510 A.2d 1233, 
1235 (Pa. 1986). Criminal cases, on the other hand, "involve issues of public justice; 
issues that transcend the immediate parties." Id. While "sanctions may be imposed upon 
individuals, including counsel for either side; sanctions that vindicate the authority of the 
court to maintain its schedule and enforce its orders[,]" dismissal of criminal charges is 
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warranted only when a prosecutor's tardiness "involve[s] a failure of justice or prejudice 
to the defendant." Id. "When such interests are not involved, the offending party may be 
otherwise sanctioned without defeating the public interest." Id. Defendant's total failure 
to address this distinction undermines his claim that Judge Frederick acted within his 
discretion in dismissing the felony information here. 
As pointed out in the State's opening brief, see Aplt. Br. at 13, defendant's claim is 
further undermined by the fact that he alleged no prejudice resulting from the 
prosecutor's tardiness below, id., and Judge Frederick found none in dismissing the 
felony information. R107-108, see add. C (Br. of Aplt.). While defendant complains that 
"there was a consistent and repeated approach of indifference demonstrated by the State" 
in this case, see Aple. Br. at 20, what defendant really appears to be saying is that the 
prosecutor had ample time to file a written response to the motion to quash prior to the 
hearing, but did not. Neither the prosecutor's decision to wait until the hearing to file a 
response, or her tardiness to the hearing itself, however, is fairly characterized as 
repetitive indifference. In any event, defendant's complaints about the prosecutor's 
tardiness do not establish any consequent prejudice or that dismissal was warranted. See 
Carson, 510 A.2d at 1235-36 (recognizing that even though the district attorney 
"cavalierly exemplified a gross indifference to the proper demands" of the trial court's 
schedule, that "indifference" "cannot inure to the benefit of a defendant who suffers no 
injustice from the (consequent) delays") (Papadakos, J., concurring). See also 
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 111 A.2d 749, 752 (Pa. 1998) (holding that while prosecutor's 
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conduct in failing to comply with a court order regarding the time for trial was improper, 
"discourteous," and an "inexcusable affront to the court," dismissal of the criminal 
charges was "excessive and thus, an abuse of discretion"); accord People v. Countryman, 
514 N.E.2d 1038, 1041 (111. App. 1987) (recognizing that the trial court's "concern with 
the way the Attorney General's office handles its cases [was] not a proper ground for 
dismissing the [] complaint for want of prosecution"). 
Finally, the only criminal case defendant cites is a one-page, unpublished 
memorandum decision, Provo City v. Lundahl, 2001 UT App 40. The Lundahl trial court 
dismissed a charge of driving on suspension against Lundahl "because Provo failed to 
respond to her motion." Id. Significantly, Lundahl, and not Provo City, appealed the 
dismissal because "she wanted the trial court to address the issues raised in her motion." 
Id. This Court dismissed the appeal, observing that Lundahl could only appeal from a 
"final judgment of conviction," and because she had not been convicted, Lundahl 
necessarily "had nothing to appeal." Id. Thus, Lundahl does not address the propriety of 
the trial court's dismissal in that, or any other criminal prosecution. Id. Rather, the most 
the case stands for is the general proposition that a defendant may not appeal from a 
dismissal. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse Judge Frederick's order quashing the felony information 
and remand this matter for trial. 
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